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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DESERET COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
JSJ CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT 
Case No. 16992 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the sale of certain industrial machinery to 
plaintiff by defendant. The machinery has never functioned pro-
perly, and plaintiff brought suit charging breach of express and 
implied warranties. Plaintiff seeks a return of the money paid for 
the defective machine, and seeks to have defendant remove the 
machine from plaintiff's premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On February 19, 1980, the trial court granted defendant's 
motion to quash service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction 
over defendant. That order was modified on March 5, 1980, by agree-
ment of the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the trial court's granting of a 
motion to quash service of process on defendant, and seeks to have 
the matter remanded for a trial on the merits. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business 
and doing business in Utah. Defendant is a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in Michigan. 
In 1975, representatives of plaintiff, in response to magazine 
advertising placed by defendant, contacted defendant at its Grand 
Haven, Michigan, headquarters to inquire about purchasing a certain 
large, custom-made packaging machine. Defendant sent its general 
manager, Lee s. Kihnke, to plaintiff's plant in Sandy, Salt Lake 
County, Utah to pursue the discussion, Affidavit of James C. Love-
less, Record on Appeal at 38. The visit was followed by corres-
pondence and telephone calls consisting of the submissions of 
proposals, quotations of prices, revisions of specifications, etc. 
Eventually, those negotiations ripened, and on November 29, 
1977, Mr. Kihnke mailed a revised proposal to plaintiff's Sandy 
office, id. Included was a document called the "Dake Installation 
Policy," Record at 46, in which defendant agreed to provide "factory 
trained technicians" to supervise installation of the machine at the 
Sandy plant. 
On February 17, 1978, plaintiff accepted the offer by mailing 
a check for $22,861.25 to defendant as a down payment on the machine, 
the total purchase price of which was $91,445, Loveless affidavit, 
Record at 39. Defendant acknowledged receipt of the order, and 
proposed a July delivery date, Record at 57. Plaintiff sent a truck 
to Michigan to pick up the machine, and on August 28, 1978, defen-
dant's "factory-trained specialist," Robert Wydeck, arrived in Utah 
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to supervise the installation, Loveless affidavit, Record at 39. 
Since that time, however, the machine has never worked properly. In 
November of 1978, two of the defendant's employees came to Utah, and 
spent several days trying to repair the machine, but without suc-
cess, id. at 40. Therefore, plaintiff sought a refund of payments 
made for the machine, and also sought its removal. When the parties 
were unable to agree on a remedy, this lawsuit was filed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT WAS PROPER UNDER UTAH 
LAW AS IT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE RULING BELOW. 
A. THIS COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER 
DEFENDANT BECAUSE IT CONTRACTED TO PROVIDE 
SERVICES IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24, provides 
in pertinent part: 
Any person ... whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or through 
an agent does any of the following enumerated 
acts, submits himself ... to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state as to any claim arising 
from: 
(1) 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
Defendant's action falls within this provision of the long-arm 
statute, and defendant is subject to the in personam jurisdiction 
of this court because it contracted to provide a "factory trained 
service technician" to supervise the installation of the machine 
in Utah which plaintiff purchased from defendant. The installa-
tion was clearly a service, and the contract to provide such a 
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service in Utah places defendant squarely within the ambit of the 
long-arm statute. 
B. THIS COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER 
DEFENDANT BECAUSE IT TRANSACTED BUSINESS IN 
THIS STATE AND CAUSED INJURY WITHIN THE STATE 
BY BREACH OF WARRANTY. 
Utah's long-arm statute also provides that a non-resident 
submits himself to the jurisdiction of Utah's courts by the 
transaction of any business within this state, or by the causing 
of any injury within this state by breach of warranty. Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-24. 
The words "transaction of business within this state" are 
defined in Utah Code Ann. §78-27-23 as: 
Activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or 
representatives in this state which affect persons 
or businesses within the State of Utah. 
Under this definition, there is little question that defendant 
transacted business in the State of Utah by coming here to solicit 
plaintiff's business, by communicating with plaintiff by telephone 
and through the mails, by selling plaintiff a machine worth some 
$90,000 knowing that it would be used in Utah, and by sending its 
employees and representatives here to install, service and attempt to 
repair the machine. Nothing could more directly "affect persons or 
businesses" within Utah than the malfunctioning of a piece of ma-
chinery essential to a Utah business. 
Defendant is also subject to the jurisdiction of this court 
because plaintiff has properly alleged that defendant caused injury 
by breach of both implied-in-law warranties and the express warranty 
contained in the contract. 
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There can be no doubt that Utah's long-arm statute purports to 
reach the defendant in this case on all three grounds discussed. The 
question then is whether subjecting this defendant to suit in Utah is 
consistent with due process, which is satisfied so long as the exer-
cise of jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice," International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
C. DUE PROCESS IS NOT OFFENDED BY SUBJECTING 
THIS DEFENDANT TO TRIAL IN UTAH. 
To establish the purpose of the long-arm statute, the legis-
lature codified the following language: 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative deter-
mination, that the public interest demands the 
state provide its citizens with an effective means 
of redress against nonresident persons, who 
through certain significant minimal contacts with 
this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled 
to the state's protection. This legislative 
action is deemed necessary because of technologi-
cal progress which has substantially increased the 
flow of commerce between the several states result-
ing in increased interaction between persons of 
this state and persons of other states. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-22 (emphasis added). The preamble to the 
long-arm statute continues: 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum 
protection to citizens of this state, should be 
applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent defendants to the fullest extent permitted by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-22. In addressing the application of those 
provisions, Justice Crockett stated: 
We consider it our responsibility to give effect 
to that objective by extending the jurisdiction of 
our courts as far as the limitations of fairness 
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and established law will permit. . . . It is 
suggested, and there seems to be validity to the 
idea, that when the activity or conduct out of 
which the claimed liability arose occurs in the 
forum state, for example, where the contract was 
executed, or is to be performed, in whole or in 
part, or where an alleged tort occurred, courts 
are generally more disposed to apply the "minimal 
contacts" test and to find jurisdiction. 
Producers Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 
1978) (emphasis added). Justice Crockett added that in order to 
assert jurisdiction over a party, the defendant must be engaged 
in substantial activities beyond mere transitory matters 
so that it is reasonable and just to assume that 
he has had the benefit of the protections and 
advantages of the laws and institutions of the 
state to the extent that it is within the concept 
of fairness and due process that he be subjected 
to the jurisdiction of its courts. 
Id. He gave three examples of transitory matters which help 
defin~ the limitations imposed on long-arm jurisdiction by con-
siderations of due process: 
where a person buys stock in a corporation, .such 
as U.S. Steel or General Motors, where the enter-
prise is located in and carried on in another 
state; or where a manufacturer advertises and 
distributes his products for sale through inde-
pendent dealers or retailers in other states; or 
where persons who are merely traveling through or 
vacationing in other states engage in single and 
transitory transactions for the purpose of normal 
subsistence and activities. (emphasis added). 
Id. That guidance is instructive and shows that this court's 
jurisdiction over the defendant in this case does not violate 
notions of due process. In each of the examples given, the 
unfairness of exercising jurisdiction is obvious. A huge public 
corporation cannot reasonably restrict the sale of its stock only 
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to citizens of certain states -- that would violate the "privi-
leges and immunities" clause of the United States Constitution, 
Art. IV § 2. Nor can it possibly foresee where it might be sub-
ject to suit if it could be haled into any forum where an ag-
grieved stockholder happened to be domiciled. Justice Crockett's 
distinction has since been recognized by the United States Sup-
reme Court, which stated that a pivotal element in the due pro-
cess inquiry is whether 
the defendant's conduct and connection with the 
forum State are such that he should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into Court there. 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567 (1980). 
Similarly, it would be unfair to predicate jurisdiction on 
the acts of an independent, autonomous distributor over whom a 
defendant could exercise no control. Finally, subjecting a 
traveler to the exercise of jurisdiction in any state where he 
made a small, isolated transaction would leave the traveler at 
the mercy of unscrupulous merchants who could file bad-faith 
actions, secure in the knowledge that the small amounts involved 
would probably force a default. Such a situation would, as a 
practical matter, so discourage travel as to intolerably burden 
interstate commerce. 
In this action, defendant contracted to perform the contract 
at issue, at least in part, by coming to Utah and installing and 
servicing the machine in question. The forum-state activity was 
more than foreseeable, it was inevitable. There was no place 
other than Utah that the installed machine could be used, or 
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where its failure could cause injury. And it is clear that 
defendant's activity was not transitory but rather substantial. 
Unlike Justice Crockett's example of an insubstantial contact by 
a manufacturer who acts only through an independent dealer or 
retailer in the forum state, defendant here did not have an 
independent dealer or retailer in Utah through which it dealt 
with plaintiff, but rather it dealt with plaintiff directly. Its 
officers and employees came to Utah on numerous occasions and 
they also communicated directly with plaintiff by telephone and 
through the mail. Nor was defendant "merely traveling" through 
the state for the purpose of engaging "in single and transitory 
transactions for the purpose of normal subsistence and activi-
ties." Clearly, defendant's actions went beyond Justice Crock-
ett's examples of_ insubstantial activity and by so acting defen-
dant has subjected itself to the jurisdiction of this court. 
Justice Crockett's opinion in Producers Livestock followed 
by a month an opinion on in personam jurisdiction by Justice 
Wilkins, Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 
850 (1978). Justice Crockett's opinion amplified the criteria 
identified by Justice Wilkins in addressing the due process 
aspects of personal jurisdiction. Justice Wilkins stated that in 
order to "infuse full vitality into the mandate by our Legis-
lature to apply the long-arm statute to the fullest extent per-
mitted by the Fourteenth Amendment," 578 P.2d at 854, an inquiry 
should be made of: 
1. The nature and quality of the defendant's acts; 
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2. Whether defendant is engaged in purposeful, 
rather than unintentional, acts in order to avail 
itself of the privileges and protections in Utah; 
and 
3. Any other relevant matters. 
The first and third elements are fairly general and somewhat un-
defined. Presumably, Justice Crockett's discussion in Producers 
Livestock is an expansion on these elements, and as we have 
argued, the defendant J.S.J. Corporation in this action falls 
within these elements for due process purposes. In addition, 
this defendant also clearly satisfies the second element identi-
fied by Justice Wilkins, since the acts in question were purpose-
ful. 
The question is not whether defendant's advertising alone 
was a sufficiently purposeful act to justify haling it into 
court. The point here is that the sale of a custom-made machine 
for installation and use exclusively in Utah is without a doubt 
sufficiently purposeful. Had defendant wished to avoid Utah 
jurisdiction, it could have declined to send plaintiff the offer 
to sell. But defendant ought not complain when a forum which it 
found to be a fair and convenient place to transact a substantial 
piece of business asks it to appear and defend an action involv-
ing that same large and expensive machine. Defendant had a 
choice, and by consenting to transact business in this forum it 
thereby submitted itself to jurisdiction of its courts. The 
motion to dismiss should have been denied. 
-9-
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II. 
CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, ANNOUNCED SINCE THE RULING 
BELOW, REQUIRES THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER 
DEFENDANTS AND A REMAND OF THIS CASE FOR TRIAL ON THE 
MERITS. 
The defendant's motion to quash was granted on February 19, 
1980, and amended by stipulation of the parties on March 5. On Marc 
4 and March 6 of 1980, this Court handed down two decisions that 
dramatically and unmistakably mandated an expansive interpretation o 
the long-arm statute. Even if plaintiff concedes, arguendo and 
contrary to the fact, that the trial court's decision in this case 
correctly reflected then-prevalent Utah law, it is apparent that the 
subsequent decisions require a contrary result, since the facts of 
this case fall squarely within the ambit of those cases.* 
In the first of those cases, Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 
608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980), the facts were strikingly similar to the 
" 
.-· 
,·: 
... 
present case. There, a Utah firm initiated contact with a Californic 
manufacturer of drilling equipment. The defendant delivered the 
equipment to Denver, Colorado, from where the plaintiff took it to a 
job site in New Mexico. When the equipment began malfunctioning, 
* The fact that the trial court's decision was rendered prior to 
these cases does not, of course, prevent this Court from applying the 
new law to this appeal. 
It is the general rule that when there is a change 
of law by judicial decision between the time of 
trial and the time of appeal the appellate court 
will dispose of the case according to the law 
prevailing at the time of the appellate disposition 
and not according to the law prevailing at the time 
of rendition of the judgment appealed. 
Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45, 47 (1969). 
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the defendant sent repair crews to the New Mexico site. Subse-
quently, plaintiff, for the first time, transported the machine 
into Utah, where it again malfunctioned on a job despite further 
repair efforts by one of the defendant's employees. In the 
ensuing litigation, jurisdiction over the defendant was predicated 
on the long-arm statute. The trial court granted a motion to 
quash, holding the contacts between the manufacturer and the Utah 
purchaser insufficient to support the exercise of personal juris-
diction. 
On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded to trial. This 
Court conceded at the outset that the defendant was not "doing 
business" within the State of Utah, and noted that there was no 
evidence that the defendant had ever sold any other product to 
any other Utah resident. However, this Court then observed that 
the long-arm statute is meant to govern those situations in which 
the non-resident defendant is not doing business within Utah, and 
that it "pertains to jurisdiction over persons concerning claims 
against them arising from certain 'minimum contacts' between 
those persons and this State." 608 P.2d at 246. That statute, 
then, was held to reach the facts of the Burt case, so long as 
the exercise of jurisdiction would be constitutional. 
In that regard, the opinion articulated the following standard: 
Due process requires that defendant's contacts 
with this State be purposeful on the part of the 
defendant so that it can be said that the defen-
dant reasonably knew that he submitted himself to 
this jurisdiction to answer for any harm caused by 
him . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). In applying that standard to the Burt 
facts, the Court said: 
-11-
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Here, the allegations of plaintiffs' com-
plaint show that their claims arise out of de-
fendant's contacts with this State, which 
were: (1) defendant purposefully contracted 
with a resident of this State, knowing that it 
was a resident, and (2) defendant purposefully 
undertook to supply goods to that resident 
reasonably knowing or anticipating that those 
goods would be used in this State . . . . 
Further, the allegations of the complaint are 
that part of the injury caused by the defec-
tive goods was sustained here. Defendant, 
therefore has had sufficient contacts with 
this State to meet the provisions of (the 
long-arm statute]. 
Id. at 247 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Court said, it was proper for Utah to exercise jur-
isdiction over the defendant, even though the Utah plaintiff ini-
tiated the contact, even though the machinery was delivered to 
Colorado and used in New Mexico, and even though only a part of 
the injury occurred in Utah. Under the Burt tests, knowingly sup-
plying equipment to a Utahn for use in Utah would sustain juris-
diction. In the present case, defendant must concede that those 
tests are satisfied. 
In his concurrence, Justice Stewart distinguished Burt from 
previous cases involving items that would normally be used in the 
locality where they were purchased.* He noted that while it 
* Specifically, Justice Stewart discussed Pelligrini v. Sachs 
& Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974), in which a Utah immigrant 
sought to sue a California automobile dealer for injuries sus-
tained in Utah as a result of alleged mechanical defects. She 
purchased the car while still a California domiciliary. The 
defendant in that case had no control over where the purchaser 
might take the car, and Justice Stewart noted that the dealer was 
not engaged in an interstate business - he sold cars only in 
California. In Burt and in the present case, however, the defen-
dants actively solicited interstate business, and knew that the 
particular products involved were to be used in Utah. 
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would be unfair to subject the vendor to the jurisdiction of a 
forum to which "the vendor had no reasonable expectation that his 
products might be transported," he concluded that a manufacturer 
of industrial goods stands in a different position. He said: 
Large nationwide or multistate businesses, 
which make great efforts to sell their pro-
ducts to as broad a population as possible, 
purposefully make use of the free channels of 
commerce and should be held accountable for 
legal actions arising out of their use of the 
nation's channels of commerce. 
608 P.2d at 256. 
The facts here argue more compellingly than did those of Burt 
for the exercise of jurisdiction. There, the equipment, though 
bulky, was portable; the mere fact of foreseeable use in Utah was an 
adequate factual basis for jurisdiction. Here, the large machine 
involved was installed on the plaintiff's premises by the defendant. 
Use in Utah was far more than foreseeable; there was no other pos-
sible place in which the machine could be used. 
In the second relevant case, Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. 
Brown, No. 15530 and 15544 (Utah, March 6, 1980), this Court sus-
tained a trial court's denial of a motion to quash service made 
by a non-resident defendant. Again, the case involved the fur-
nishing of an allegedly defective product for use in Utah. This 
Court adverted to the evolutionary aspect of Utah decisions, and 
it reiterated the Burt criteria for applicability of the long-arm 
statute: the purposeful act of manufacture and sale of an item 
where its use in Utah is foreseeable. Id., slip op. at 3. This 
was true despite the fact that the defendant had no office, 
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property or agents in Utah, nor did it advertise within the 
State. Under the Burt test, these once-dispositive factors 
became irrelevant. Id. 
The Mallory opinion then considered whether subjecting the 
defendant to Utah's jurisdiction comported with due process, and 
concluded that the question involved balancing the inconvenience 
to the defendant against the interests of the state in assuming 
jurisdiction. The Court's observation is worth quoting at some 
length: 
This Court recognizes that any litiga-
tion undertaken in a foreign jurisdiction 
results in some inconvenience to the non-
resident defendant. The fact that [the 
defendant] had no general offices or opera-
tions in the State and scheduled no repre-
sentation in the State, substantiate its 
assertions of inconvenience. However, the 
inconvenience to the nonresident must be 
viewed in relation to the importance of the 
conflict litigated, which, in a commercial 
setting, is evidenced by the amount in con-
troversy. If the amount is trivial in 
comparison to the expense of litigating in 
the foreign forum and the possibility of the 
defendant defaulting reaches sufficient 
proportions, the demands of fair play and 
substantial justice dictate the reservation 
of the state's jurisdictional power.· 
In undertaking interestate (sic) business, 
[the defendant] must recognize and accomodate 
within its operations the probability and 
necessity of litigating in foreign forums. 
. . . . Balanced against the above consider-
ations is the express interest the State of 
Utah has in ensuring protection to its resi-
dents from the unlawful acts of non-residents. 
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Balancing the importance of this inter-
est in relation to commercial transactions 
involving the supply of goods into the state 
by a non-resident manufacturer, and the 
relatively minor degree of inconvenience 
required to defend this action in Utah, we 
hold the district court's extension of juris-
diction over [the defendant] to be reason-
able. Therefore, the district court's juris-
diction . did not abridge the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . 
Id., slip op. at 4. 
The due process test of Mallory, then, is satisfied in this 
case. The amount in controversy is over $90,000--the cost of the 
machine. Surely, that will dissuade defendant from defaulting. 
Although the defendant in this case may not have directed its 
trade journal advertising specifically at Utah readers, the mere 
fact that it advertises nationally indicates an intention to make 
sales to customers in distant forums. Such an intent, as this 
Court has recognized, gives rise to a correllative obligation to 
litigate in those forums--that is an integral cost of doing 
business. 
In the present case, a balancing of the interests involved 
strongly supports Utah's exercise of jurisdiction. The machine 
is located in Utah. Trial testimony will center around its con-
dition, so it will no doubt have to be inspected by witnesses, 
and perhaps even by the trier of fact. The issue will be the 
condition of this particular machine, not the general integrity 
of defendant's manufacturing process. All this suggests that a 
Utah forum will be far more convenient for the witnesses. Nor do 
any facts suggest that a Utah forum would be any less convenient 
to defendant than a Michigan forum would be to plaintiff, and 
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equal inconvenience ought not be enough to disturb a plaintiff's 
forum choice. Finally, Utah has a substantial interest in pro-
viding a forum in which its residents may seek redress from a 
non-resident manufacturer who knows that if his product mal-
functions, the resultant injury will be suffered in Utah. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This case involves the propriety of exercising jurisdiction 
over a non-resident manufacturer of a large, custom-made machine 
that the defendant manufacturer installed in plaintiff's Utah 
plant. The machine has never operated properly, and plaintiffs 
sought redress in Utah District Court. The trial court granted 
defendant's motion to quash service of process for lack of juris-
diction. This appeal is from that judgment. 
The case is squarely within the purview of Utah's long-arm 
statute because defendants both contracted to supply services in 
Utah -- namely, installation and because plaintiffs sustained 
injuries in Utah arising out of defendant's breach of both ex-
press and implied warranties. Because defendant's act of selling 
and installing this large and expensive machine to plaintiff was 
clearly purposeful, it is apparent that defendant sought to avail 
itself of the benefits of undertaking commercial activity within 
this state. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction was proper under 
the Producers Livestock standard, which prevailed at the time of 
the trial court's ruling. 
Moreover, subsequent decisions by this Court, which control 
this appeal, unmistakably require the exercise of jurisdiction. 
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Burt Drilling, a factually similar case involving a large but 
portable machine, sustained jurisdiction predicated on foresee-
ability of the product's use in Utah. Here, the machine is not 
portable. It could only be used in Utah, and thus it was inevit-
able that any injury arising out of its malfunctioning would be 
sustained in Utah. The due process test of Mallory Engineering 
is satisfied because the amount in controversy, some $90,000, is 
substantial enough to insure that defendant will not default. 
The interests of the plaintiff and the forum state argue for 
jurisdiction in Utah, as does the presence of the machine, which 
is the subject of this litigation and which will almost certainly 
have to be inspected by witnesses, if not by the trier of fact. 
Defendants may be somewhat inconvenienced by the Utah forum, but 
as this Court noted in Mallory Engineering, that is the inevit-
able consequence of electing to engage in interstate commerce, 
and is certainly insufficient, by itself, to disturb plaintiff's 
forum choice. 
For the foregoing reasons, jurisdiction over defendant must 
be exercised. The motion to quash granted below should be 
reversed, and the case remanded for trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of June, 1980. 
K&~~ 
of & for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
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